Abstract-An ITER hard core component (HCC) is defined for each undesirable situation with cliff edge effect consequences. Such structure system components (SCCs) are designed to prevent these situations at nuclear power plants, as well as to return and maintain a safe state in the event such a situation occurs. Only two hard core situations can really lead to cliff edge effect unless HCCs are implemented to limit the consequences: extreme earthquake (SL-3) and multiples fire in tritium building initiated by SL-3. The equipment (window and/or shutter) that closes penetrations from both sides of gallery to outside (Diagnostic building, Tritium building, and Assembly building) are classified as HCCs and SIC-2. Design status of the HCC penetrations belong to US ITER diagnostic systems will be presented in this publication.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
ONSIDERING the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, the council of the European Union declared that the safety of All EU nuclear plants should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk assessment ("stress analysis"). The technical specifications for the stress test report prepared by Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) answer to the national requirements providing some extensions. The stress test is a targeted assessesment of the safety margins of nuclear facilities for natural events challenging the facility safety functions and leading to severe accident [8] . Focusing on ITER, the assessment consists of the following.
1) An evaluation of the resistance of the nuclear facility, a set of extreme situations. 2) A verification of the preventive and mitigation measures chosen the following defense-in depth logic (noting any potential weak point and cliff edge effect): initiating events, consequential loss of safety function, and severe accident management.
ITER organization was notified by (ASN) "Autorite de Surete Nucleaire" through an ASN decision in May 2011 to propose by January 15, 2012; the safety strategy and methodology for the first nuclear facility for fusion energy (in particular, the methodology for identification and analysis of the situations with cliff edge effect) and by October 15, 2012, the exhaustive list of the situations with cliff edge effects and proposal of hard core components (HCC) need to reach and maintain the safe state. According to Evaluation Complémentaire de la Sureté report, HCC's are defined as those SCCs important for the safety of the plant which are needed in extreme scenarios to prevent cliff edge effects, defined as follows:
1) dose to population above 10 mSv; 2) contamination of the ground water; 3) high radiation field which avoids long-term human intervention on the site.
According to [7] , 12 scenarios or hard core situations have been considered potentially dangerous which lead to cliff edge effects. Further evaluations clarified that out of the 12 scenarios, only two hard core situations can really lead to cliff edge effects unless HCCs are implemented to limit the consequences as follows:
1) extreme earthquake (SL-3) in Tokamak building; 2) multiples fire in tritium building initiated by SL-3.
In the case of extreme earthquake (SL-3), the failure of the cryogenic tanks situated in the cryogenic fluid storage area has been postulated; this risk can be the cause of an accidental situation with the cliff edge effect. From technical standpoint, the fact that SL-3 is considered for Mode 0 of the Tokamak machine makes some scenario of explosion very pessimistic or not very realistic. (The quench tanks which have a major contribution to the blast load are not full in such a scenario Mode 0.) It is important to remind that in the earthquake field investigation which an important base of the seismic design standard is. Hence, the HCCs have to be protected from the aggression induced as the explosion in the cryogenic fluid storage area. A dedicated analysis for explosion in this area will be performed by International Organization (IO) [9] . However, this accident is outside of the scope of the systems described in this publication. The analysis approaches generally used within the scope of design rely on spectral methods and linear transient methods, for which the results may possibly be used to perform pseudostatic calculations.
0093-3813 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
Methods of analysis based on linear models are considered as reference methods in determining loads. These methods are particularly suitable to show that the requirements are met, such as requirements in terms of leak tightness, subcritical geometry, and load-bearing capacity. Nevertheless, these methods of analysis aiming at representing an incursion into the postelastic domain are deemed acceptable to meet integrity and stability requirements. A simplified nonlinear static method can be used to verify stability requirements or the absence of detrimental interaction. Transient methods applicable to nonlinear models are also acceptable.
The The ITER zoning strategy is described in Fig. 1 . It identifies various types of zoning such as magnetic zoning, waste zoning, explosion zoning, fire zoning, radiologic zoning, confinement (ventilation) zoning, and beryllium zoning.
The first confinement barrier is between the vacuum vessel and the port cell. The safety barriers or the second confinement is between the port cell and the gallery and the gallery and the closed buildings (Diagnostic building, Assembly building, or Tritium building). HCC's are defined at these borders.
A secondary confinement is commonly used for a system containing a safety barrier and a pressure cascade. The barrier and the pressure cascade are intended to confine the earlier mentioned substances and prevent release into the environment Zone division at the Tokamak complex and closed buildings. * Penetrations themselves are SIC-2 between gallery and outside. HCC is the equipment around the penetrations. during degraded situations caused by the first confinement system failure.
The diagnostic systems components will pass through safety barriers, the penetrations of cabling or fiber bundles using existing cable tray penetrations.
It is shown in Figs. 1 and 2, HCC's are between the Gallery and the Diagnostic building. (In the diagnostic system boundary barrier.) In the gallery, the HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) system maintains a depression centered in the range of −50 Pa with respect to then to the diagnostics building pressure. Therefore, the Gallery and the Diagnostic building belong to a different ventilation zone.
The gallery is classified as beryllium-controlled zone, the diagnostic building is not a beryllium zone, and also, the Gallery and the Diagnostic buildings belong to two different fire sectors.
III. CAPTIVE COMPONENTS
Some components in ITER are called the captive components because they are needed before other systems or component, according to the assembly sequence. A good example is the transmission lines (TLs) of diagnostic components which are located above cable trays (installation as a part of the building services).
Each system should provide the design solution to avoid a captive component situation. Only in the case that the situation is unavoidable, the early delivery of those components is requested. The delivery date is linked with the construction of the Tokamak building. The strategy from IO is to install the TLs; the lowest available position in order to avoid having captive components in the diagnostic system.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF SIC-2 PENETRATIONS
The development of the penetrations design is divided in several steps.
1) Integration Into the Building: To make sure that the computer-aided drafting status of each particular system is up to date and according to the detailed model. 2) Analysis of the Environment: Identify if there are captive components. Identify the potential risks coming from the environment such as equipment failure may jeopardize the SIC-2 components, also identify from external services such as cooling, service vacuum, or compressed air. 3) Development the Safety Strategy: To correctly accomplish the safety functions of the system. 4) Load Definition: Each system load specification should include loads acting on the whole system, including all the rooms and pressure boundaries. For HCC's, in addition, there are two scenarios (as it was defined previously): a) extreme earthquake (SL-3) in Tokamak building; b) multiples' fire in Tritium building initiated by SL-3. 5) Qualification Phase: It justifies that the component can withstand the normal and abnormal environment conditions that may arise from an accident at the end of their service life for which their operation is needed. It is very important to remark that every system shall provide the capability to testing and to monitoring parameters, as necessary, to ensure availability, and function, as credited in the safety analysis.
V. GENERAL PENETRATION APPROACH
The penetrations will be designed according to [11] - [13] , considered as safety barrier. Thus, the features through the surface are: 1) enclosure of toxic, radiological flammable, corrosive, and explosive substances; 2) Division of risks arising from pressure, fire temperature, radiation, and mechanical loads. The general preliminary approach for outside of the penetration is to finish the penetrations by a flange. The maximum length for waveguides will be 2 m (wall thickness: 1.5 m, leaving 250 mm on both ends). The waveguides are supported from outside the penetration with dedicated frame welded on embedded plates. To avoid passing loads from the TL to the penetration, breakers are inserted between TL and valves or windows. The breaker could be made of ceramic/plastic with copper coating.
VI. DIAGNOSTIC OVERVIEW
A. Tangential Interferometer-Polarimeter (TIP)
The diagnostic uses a vibration compensated for interferometer in conjunction with a polarimetry system for fringeskip mitigation. Five such systems, operating independently, provide risk mitigation through redundancy. The five chords additionally provide some information about the density profile, and, in particular, the fifth-chord tangents the pedestal region providing a boundary condition for profile reconstruction. Inside the port plug drawer is located the injection optics consisting of a set of mirror dogleg with a single exit aperture to mitigate streaming neutrons. Five cornercube retroreflectors (CCRs) are located in various blanket modules on the equatorial midplane of the Tokamak. These are protected as the best possible from plasma and radiation damage. At the back of the port plug is a set of five double windows acting as the primary boundary. The back-end optical components comprised of the injection lasers and injection optics located in the diagnostic Hall. The current design assumes individual beam tubes for each laser beam, located in the port cell or interspace is an active alignment system that steers the beam into the front-end optics and maintains alignment of the beam of the CCRs during large-scale motion of the Tokamak relative to the diagnostic back end.
The passive confinement approach would implement intermediate windows in each of the beam tubes. From the diagnostic perspective, there are two problems with these additional windows. First, losses due to reflection and absorption will reduce the return laser signal strength. Second, potentially more important, motion of the beam on these windows, due to the operation of the real-time alignment system, will result in increased noise in the measurements, unless the parallelism of the window surfaces is extremely good. Hence, from the diagnostic performance perspective, there is a clear preference for the active confinement approach utilizing valves instead of windows.
B. Low-Field-Side Reflectometer (LFSR)
This system is one of several reflectometer systems planned for ITER. The low-field-side reflectometer (LFSR) microwaves reflecting off the O-and X-mode cutoffs in the plasma are used to probe the ON-and OFF-axis edge pedestal and scrape-off payer electron density (ne) profiles. The LFSR will also be sued for core magnetohydrodynamic and turbulence measurements on ITER. The LFS system includes the antenna and transmission life for a Doppler reflectometer for turbulence rotation measurements.
The front-end components of the LFSR are housed in an equatorial port plug. The current design contains six circular waveguides that function as both launch and receive antennas, with penetrations through the diagnostics first wall providing access to the plasma. The millimeter waves are coupled quasioptically to the plasma. The millimeter waves are coupled quasi-optically to the corresponding waveguides outside the vacuum through double quartz windows and quasi-optical Gaussian telescopes.
The reference design features six broadband multimode corrugated circular waveguide TLs. The total length of the waveguide runs from launch-receive horn to source/detector is approximately 40 m.
VII. DESIGN OPTIONS FOR PENETRATIONS
The safety function of the penetrations are to guarantee the zoning classification explained above and to guarantee confinement and avoiding fire spreading from one fire sector to another in all conditions and events capable of withstanding the loads maintaining the associated maximum leak under its limit according ITER project requirements. This is the way that safety function is guaranteed could be based on a passive solution or active solution.
A. Passive Solution
A passive solution will use SIC-2 window assemblies at the penetrations to the gallery and to the diagnostic building. In order to keep the safety function of the penetration, the bypasses are equipped with SIC-2 equipment normally closed-isolation valves.
In Mode 0, during plasma operation, the isolation valves remain open; however, the fail position is closed. No SIC gas supply needed for its closure.
In Mode 1, during test and conditioning, valves will be open the period where the line will be evacuated in order to obtain the required level of vacuum. Nonsafety relevant pressure sensors will determine the required pressure at the end of the line at the diagnostic building. During maintenance operations, valves will remain closed.
In Mode 2, valves will remain closed. In accidental situations, valves will remain close if this was its previous state or they will close if the accidents occur during the test and conditioning. Isolation valves will be controlled by SIC cubicles.
This passive solution implies that safety requirements are mixed with diagnostic performance requirements (required window material and thickness).
B. Active Solution
This option is based on the use of safety valves in the penetrations avoiding SIC-2 windows. This option will allow decoupling the safety and diagnostics performance functions by having an optical TL equipped with safety valves.
In Mode 0, during plasma operation, the isolation valves remain open. Valves will be maintained open only when it is needed for the diagnostic operation. Thus, there are two options:
1) an external signal from the central control system allowing the machine for operation; 2) an internal signal from the diagnostic shows that the system is ready at the required vacuum level. In Mode 1, during test and conditioning, valves will be open during a period to get the needed vacuum. Once the required vacuum level is achieved, valves will be closed unless the operation of the machine is ready to start. During maintenance operations, valves will remain closed, to check the air leak, it will be controlled automatically by SVS (service vacuum system), in this case, opening of the valves would be needed for short period of time in order to detect leaks.
In Mode 2, valves will remain closed.
In accidental situations, valves will remain close if this was its previous state or they will close if the accident occurs during the test and conditioning.
VIII. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR TIP
The TIP design for the TL is a double pipe with internal ring to allow axial movement and avoid additional stress. Every support for the waveguides in zone 1 (gallery) will be seismic class. The valve will be HCC managed by valve belong to PBS48 and another non-SIC valve from PBS 55. The distance between HCC and penetration will have fire insolation to avoid thermal expansion.
All components will be located away from the penetration in order not to have any captive component.
A non-SIC window is necessary to avoid mixture of gas between port cell and diagnostic room.
From the point of view of diagnostic performance, the beam tubes could operate at or near the ambient pressure with air inside. Of course, the ambient pressure in the diagnostic hall, the gallery, and the port cell are all slightly different, in order to facilitate confinement boundaries. From the diagnostic perspective, the lines would be open (at the same pressure) from diagnostic hall to interspace, with a window in the diagnostic hall and seals along the lines to the interspace. I think a sensible strategy is to provide "hermetic" seals but not "high vacuum" seals for these lines. The quality of these seals will depend on the maximum allowable leakage permitted between confinement zones.
IX. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR LFSR
For LFSR, two bellows will be included in the waveguide lines to permit thermal expansion and avoid stress at the penetration.
The supports will be seismic class. The design of the HCC and the additional valves are equavalent to TIP. Also, a non-SIC window will be installed at the diagnostic building to avoid mixture of gas between buildings. A breaker (a mechanical fuse) will be installed between the penetration and the shielding to avoid stresses in accidental scenarios at the penetrations.
LFSR system is preparing for a preliminary design review and we can proportion an overview of the structural attachment of the system. The structure for thee system is formed by In addition, there is an individual adjustment of each waveguide holder in two directions to accommodate the building variations.
Each waveguide has holders that consist of rollers with brackets that keep the waveguides on the rollers during seismic events.
Some holders fix waveguides at the penetration position not to produce any additional stress in the elastomer and sleeve.
There are couplers to join waveguide pieces together. Couplers maintain the relative position and alignment between waveguide pieces.
X. CONCLUSION
An introduction of HCC requirements for ITER has been defined, and the progress of the design for penetrations' SIC-2 between the gallery and the diagnostic building for US ITER with HCC has been described in this paper. The goal of the final design is to obtain a standardization of the HCC design and SIC-2 penetrations design without losing the performance of the diagnostic. We are working in the scenario analysis to design the correct fire insulation for components and breakers and bellows to avoid any stress in the penetration itself. The active solution is more complex than that of the passive solution because the active valves require valvecontrolled hardware and software; however, standardization of valves in each diagnostic makes the application of the active solution somewhat easier. The passive solutions are easier for implementation because there is no need to control hardware and software; however, different window designs are needed for different diagnostics. Russell Feder received the master's degrees in mechanical engineering from the Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, USA, and the master's degree in nuclear engineering from Penn State University, State College, PA, USA.
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